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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SEX DISCRIMINATION IN PRIVATE
UNIVERSITIES AS STATE ACTION

Weise v. Syracuse University
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983' a person who has been deprived
of his constitutional rights under color of state law or custom may
seek redress by instituting a civil suit for damages. While the statute
is generally limited to acts of the states, 2 ostensibly private conduct
can become the subject of a section 1983 claim if the government is
so involved in supporting, promulgating, or otherwise condoning
the private act as to make it, for all intents and purposes, the act of
the state.3 Whereas in most instances a substantial showing of state
involvement in the private activity has been required to establish
the necessary state action, 4 in Jackson v. Statler Foundation5 the
Second Circuit had concluded that in cases alleging racial
discrimination application of a less stringent test for finding state6
action is warranted. More recently, in Weise v. Syracuse University,
the Second Circuit further expanded the scope of section 1983's
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U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects .. , any citizen of the United States ... to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
2 Because § 1983 finds the source of its authority in the fourteenth amendment,
Williams v. Yellow Cab Co., 200 F.2d 302, 307 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 840 (1953);
Oppenheimer v. Stillwell, 132 F. Supp. 761, 763 (S.D. Cal. 1955), it, like the amendment,
applies only to acts of the states and does not reach the misdeeds of private individuals. See
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
1 In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), where a private restaurant was located in a state-owned building and operated in conjunction with a state parking
facility, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant's discrimination against blacks had
indeed become the act of the state because "[t]he State [had] so far insinuated itself into a
position of interdependence with [the defendant] that it must be recognized as a joint
Id. at 725. Other cases illustrate that the requisite
participant in the challenged activity ....
state action in § 1983 proceedings may take varied forms. See, e.g., McQueen v. Druker, 438
F.2d 781, 785 (1st Cir. 1971) (pervasive oversight of private landlords); Fortin v. Darlington
Little League, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 473 (D.R.I. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 514 F.2d 344 (ist
Cir. 1975) (financial support and physical upkeep of Little League).
I See, e.g., Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-72 (1972); New York City Jaycees,
Inc. v. United States Jaycees, Inc., 512 F.2d 856, 858-59 (2d Cir. 1975); Powe v. Miles, 407
F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968); Pennsylvania v. Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782, 788 (E.D. Pa. 1967),
afJfd, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968).
5 496 F.2d 623, 628, reconsiderationdenied, 496 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975), noted in 49 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 283 (1975).
"522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'g and remanding Mortenson v. Syracuse Univ., 10 BNA
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1312 (N.D.N.Y. 1974) and Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 10 BNA Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 1316 (N.D.N.Y. 1974).
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protection by holding that the less exacting state action standard of
Jackson may be employed where discrimination based on sex is
alleged.
Selene Weise's application for a lecturer's position at Syracuse
University was rejected in favor of that of an allegedly less qualified
male. Although thereafter granted a teaching assistantship, she filed
sex discrimination charges with the New YOrk State Division of
Human Rights7 and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC)8 against the University, its chancellor, and
several other officials on the basis of their allegedly discriminatory
denial of her application. Subsequently, Ms. Weise learned that her
teaching assistantship would be terminated in accordance with a
new University policy preferring masters candidates to doctoral
candidates. Claiming that she was the only doctoral candidate
affected by this policy, 9 Weise filed hew charges of sex
discrimination with the EEOC and consolidated them with her
previous complaint.
Jo Davis Mortenson found herself in a similarly difficult position. After she had served as an assistant professor for 5 years, and
at the same time that two allegedly less qualified males were
retained, Dr. Mortenson's application for tenure was denied and
her employment at Syracuse University terminated. 10 Notwithstanding the fact that a committee of the University senate, acting
at Mortenson's request, agreed that the termination was effected
without proper consideration of her qualifications, the English
Department refused to reconsider its decision. As a result,
Mortenson too filed charges of sex discrimination with the EEOC. 1 '
Having received "Notices of Right to Sue" from the EEOC, 12
The plaintiff's charges were filed with the New York State Division of Human Rights
pursuant to N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 295(6) (McKinney 1972). That section empowers the agency
to receive, investigate, and pass upon complaints alleging violations of the Human Rights
Law, id. §§ 290 et seq., as amended (McKinney Supp. 1975), which proscribes, among other
things, sex discrimination in employment. Id. § 296.
1 The EEOC receives complaints in which unlawful employment practices are alleged
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974), which empowers the
Commission to investigate and act upon such charges. Sex-based discrimination in the hiring
or discharge of any individual has been expressly designated an unlawful employment
practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
9 Ms. Weise alleged that a male doctoral candidate had his teaching assistantship
renewed at the same time that her reappointment was denied. 522 F.2d at 402.
'Id. One professor was recommended for tenure and the other received an extension
of employment without tenure. Unlike plaintiff Mortenson, neither possessed a doctoral
degree or had any of his work published. In addition, the plaintiff's husband was granted
tenure at this tine and the University's hiring regulations prohibited the granting of tenure
to both a husband and wife. Id.
I Id. at 403.
12 When the EEOC either dismisses a charge of unlawful employment practices or fails
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Weise and Mortenson independently brought actions in the district
court alleging that Syracuse University deprived them of their
constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,3 conspired to
deprive them of equal protection of the laws in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3),14 and discriminated against them in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.15 Finding Title VII
inapplicable to the cases at bar and insufficient state action to
support the section 1983 and 1985(3) claims, the district court
dismissed the complaints.1 6 In Weise the Second Circuit consolidated the appeals 17 and reversed and remanded each for further
proceedings.18
to take action on the charge within 180 days of the date of filing, the complainant receives a
"Notice of Right to Sue" and may bring a civil action against the respondent. Such an action
must be commenced within 90 days of the receipt of notice from the Commission. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
" The plaintiffs asked for declaratory and injunctive relief, punitive and actual
damages, costs, and attorneys' fees. In addition, Weise sought appointment to the faculty at
the University, and Mortenson demanded to be reinstated in her former position. 522 F.2d
at 401.
1442 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970) prohibits two or more individuals from conspiring to
deprive any person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws.
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974). Sex-based
discrimination in employment is expressly proscribed in id. § 2000e-2(a).
' 6 Mortenson, 10 BNA Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1314; Weise, id. at 1318. The district court
dismissed the Title VII claims because it found that all the instances of discrimination
alleged by the plaintiffs occurred prior to 1972 during which time educational institutions
had been exempted from the Act's coverage. Id. at 1314; id. at 1318. The § 1983 claims were
dismissed for lack of state action, and the § 1985(3) claims were dismissed both for this
reason and on the additional ground that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately allege the
requisite conspiracy. Id. at 1313-14; id. at 1318.
" 522 F.2d at 400 n.l.
'8 The district court's dismissal of the § 1985(3) claims for lack of state action and for
failure to adequately allege conspiracy was reversed by the Second Circuit. The court found
that the state action issue had been decided prematurely, but considered that finding
irrelevant to a § 1985(3) claim since "[i]t is clearly established that § 1985(3) embraces a
limited category of private conspiracies, and that there is no state action requirement." Id. at
408. As to the district court's ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently allege
conspiracy, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs' allegations were at least sufficient to
survive defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Id.
The Second Circuit also reversed the district court's ruling on the Title VII claims.
When originally enacted in 1964, Title VII exempted educational institutions from its
purview. This exemption was removed, however, with the passage of § 3 of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-26 1, § 3, 86 Stat. 103, superseding Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 702, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I
(Supp. IV, 1974)). While the Second Circuit agreed with the lower court's determination that
the initial acts complained of occurred prior to 1972, it found that both plaintiffs had also
alleged instances of proscribed discrimination occurring in early 1973: the failure to
consider Weise for a second teaching assistantship and the refusal to reexamine Mortenson's
termination. 522 F.2d at 409-10.
More significantly, however, the plaintiffs urged the court, albeit unsuccessfully, to hold
that where alleged acts of discrimination occurred prior to the removal of the exemption,
Title VII should be applied retroactively. Their contention was based on the fact that the
statute had recently been retroactively applied in Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 507 F.2d
1300 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 987 (1975), where the federal government, which
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In support of their claims the plaintiffs argued that the
University was engaged in state action by virtue of the fact that it
received state funds and abided by the state's general educational
regulations.' " Judge Smith, writing for a unanimous panel, 20 began
by conceding that these indicia of government involvement would
most likely be insufficient to support a finding of state action where
a right other than sexual or racial equality.is at issue. 2 ' Indeed, the
Weise court recognized a line of cases which rejected claims of state
action based on similar degrees of government involvement with
private educational institutions. 2 2 The Second Circuit distinguished
these decisions from the case at bar, however, by viewing them as
academic disciplinary disputes involving first amendment rights.23
More significantly, the panel concluded that state action holdings
concerning one type of state involvement and a particular
provision of the Bill of Rights are not necessarily dispositive of
claims alleging other varieties of government involvement and
24
seeking vindication of different constitutional guarantees.
had similarly enjoyed exempt status prior to the 1972 amendments, see Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 702, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (Supp. IV,
1974), was the employer. The Weise court, however, found Brown distinguishable. The panel
pointed out that while the original Title VII excluded the federal government from its
definition of "employer," a proviso stipulated that it was the policy of the United States to
refrain from discrimination in employment. Therefore, the court continued, anyone
suffering job discrimination at the federal level could seek relief through administrative
grievance procedures. 522 F.2d at 410. The 1972 amendments gave a private right of action
to federal employees who were not satisfied with the resultant administrative decisions.
While Brown admittedly provides for judicial review of formerly unreviewable administrative
actions, in effect it is only giving federal employees an additional forum for the enforcement
of a right they already had. Id. at 4 10-11. Although educational institutions, on the other
hand, were also excluded from the coverage of Title VII prior to the 1972 amendments,
employees of these institutions had no federal administrative remedy to pursue in instances
of sex discrimination. Id. at 410. Since the clear intent of the amendments was to impose new
substantive requirements on educational institutions, id. at 411, the Weise court reasoned that
retroactive application of Title VII to the defendant would amount to an "ex posto facto
imposition of civil liability." Id.
19The plaintiffs alleged that Syracuse University received a substantial amount of public
funds from the state and federal governments through both direct grants and payments for
services rendered under contracts. The state, moreover, was alleged to be extensively
involved in the supervision and regulation of the University, although the record did not
disclose the precise nature of this regulation. 522 F.2d at 404. Whereas the court recognized
that the existence of federal involvement was irrelevant since § 1983 applies only to acts of
the states, id., citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1346 (2d Cir.
1972),
New York State's participation in the defendant's activities remained significant.
2
1judges Oakes and Timbers joined in Judge Smith's opinion.
21522 F.2d at 405. See also Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975).
22 522 F.2d at 403-04. For a discussion of the cases acknowledged by the Weise court as
having involved similar degrees of state participation in the alleged misconduct of private
educational institutions, see notes 39-44 and accompanying text infra.
23 522 F.2d at 405.

24 Id. at 404, citing Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 874 (1974).
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Recalling its previous decision in Jackson v. Statler Foundation,2 a
where it was held that when the private conduct challenged
involves racial discrimination the courts should be more willing to
find state action, the Weise court ruled that sex discrimination is

misconduct of a similarly offensive character and decided that a
less exacting standard for determining state action should be

applied.2 6
The proper test for establishing the requisite state action,

Judge Smith continued, was also to be found in Jackson. According
to that decision, the following factors should be examined when a
state action claim is considered:
(1) the degree to which the "private" organization is dependent
on governmental aid; (2) the extent and intrusiveness of the
governmental regulatory scheme; (3) whether that scheme
connotes government approval of the activity or whether the
assistance is merely provided to all without such connotation; (4)
the extent to which the organization serves a public function or
acts as a surrogate for the State; [and] (5) whether the organization has legitimate claims to recognition as a "private"
organiza27
tion in associational or other constitutional terms.

Applying the Jackson criteria to the facts of Weise, the Second
28
Circuit conceded that the fourth factor, serving a public function,
25 496

F.2d 623, 628-29 (2d Cir. 1974).

26 522 F.2d at 406. The court did acknowledge that the consequences suffered by the

plaintiffs in two of the discipline cases were probably as serious as those involved in Weise. In
Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973), the plaintiff law students
were permanently expelled from the school despite their claim that the faculty had infringed
upon their right to free speech by deliberately giving them failing grades in retaliation for
certain controversial antiwar activities. Similarly, in Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96
(2d Cir.), iert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974), the plaintiff alleged violation of his first
amendment rights after he was fired from the defendant's medical faculty due to a conflict
with his superior over the publication of research findings. Nevertheless, the Weise court
distinguished Wahba and Grafton on the ground that they did not involve invidious classbased discrimination. Rather, the activities affected in these cases, the grading of academic
examinations and the conducting of scientific research, were matters which the panel
deemed to be outside the realm of judicial competence and therefore unsuitable for resolution by a court. 522 F.2d at 406.
27 496 F.2d at 629.
28 It has been suggested that when a private organization (or individual) performs what
is essentially a public function, it forfeits its private character, assumes the mantle of state
action, and becomes subject to those provisions of the Constitution governing the states. See,
e.g., Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (operation
of a shopping center); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (operation of a "company
town").
It has even been contended that because education is by nature a public function all
educational institutions are engaged in state action. Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane
Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La.), vacated sub nom. Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane
Educ. Fund, 207 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir.), rev'd on retrial, 212 F.
Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962). The dispute in Guillory was generated by the racially discriminatory admissions policy of Tulane University. Claiming that it was a private institution beyond
the reach of the fourteenth amendment, the defendant contended that it was free to discrim-
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had been settled in favor of Syracuse University2 9 and that the
third factor, state approval as opposed to passivity, 30 also seemed to
favor the defendant's position. 3 1 The first two factors, dependence
on governmental aid 32 as well as the extent of governmental coninate as it saw fit. Rejecting this argument, the district court initially ruled that the circumstances warranted a finding of state action. Since "education is a matter affected with the
greatest public interest," 203 F. Supp. at 858, grave doubts were voiced as to whether any
university could claim "private" status, unrestricted by the guarantees of the Constitution.
Furthermore, the district court ruled that a finding of state action could also be justified on
the basis of the state's involvement with the University. This involvement included Tulane's
enjoyment of a tax exemption, its operation under a legislative franchise, its use of state
lands, and the presence of three public officials on its governing board. Id. at 863-64. In
reconsidering on retrial, however, the alleged indicia of state involvement set forth above,
the district court concluded that they were insufficient to support the finding that the actions
of the University were, in reality, those of the state. According to the court, that the state
significantly influenced the operation of the University or its discriminatory admissions
policy was not adequately demonstrated. 212 F. Supp. at 683-87. See also Van Alstyne, The
Judicial Trend Touard Student Academic Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 290, 291 (1968);
Comment, Student Due Process in the Private University: The State Action Doctrine, 20 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 911, 916-17 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Student Due Process].
In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has substantially limited the use of the public
function theory. As the Court itself has stated, "the fact that government has engaged in a
particular acitivity does not necessarily mean that an individual entrepreneur or manager of
the same kind of undertaking suffers the same constitutional inhibitions." Evans v. Newton,
382 U.S. 296, 300 (1966). In a subsequent decision, the Court went so far as to suggest that
for a private activity to be deemed state action on the theory that a public function is being
performed, the service offered should be one that the state is under an affirmative duty to
provide. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974). See generally 44
TUL. L. REV. 184 (1969).
29 The plaintiffs also argued that Syracuse University was engaged in state action
because of its involvement in the public function of education, a theory not without support.
See, e.g., Belk v. Chancellor of Washington Univ., 336 F. Supp. 45, 48 (E.D. Mo. 1970); note
28 supra. Nevertheless, having previously rejected the public function approach as applied to
educational institutions, see, e.g., Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137, 1140 (2d
Cir. 1973); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1968), the Second Circuit in Weise chose
not to depart from its former position. 522 F.2d at 404 n.6. In so ruling, the panel appears
to be in accord with Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353-54 & n.9 (1974),
and Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 300 (1966).
30 The Jackson court had indicated that if state assistance and regulation are routinely
extended to all members of a given private class, no basis for inferring the state's approval of
the recipients activities would exist. See 496 F.2d at 629.
31 The record before the court contained no evidence that the State had in any way
approved of the University's allegedly discriminatory policies. The panel explained that a
different result could be reached if on remand it is established that the State had been
involved in developing the antinepotism rule, which prohibited the granting of tenure to
both a husband and a wife, complained of by Dr. Mortenson. 522 F.2d at 407. There was no
suggestion of even the possibility that the State may have approved of the acts complained of
by Ms. Weise.
32 The receipt of state funds is a critical factor in determining whether or not state
action is present. See Cohen, The Private-PublicLegal Aspects of Institutions of Higher Education,
45 DENVER L.J. 643, 646 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Cohen]; Ruben & Willis, Discrimination
Against Women in Employment in Higher Education, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 472, 485 (1971). For
example, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that where state funds are used by public schools to pay
membership dues in the National Collegiate Athletic Association, the Association's acts with
regard to these schools amount to state action. Associated Students, Inc. v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974). Similarly, the acts of a local Little
League were deemed to amount to state action where the government owned and paid for
the upkeep of the group's facilities. Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 376 F. Supp.
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trol,3 3 however, were issues which the court could not resolve

without additional evidence. 3 4 As for the fifth and final factor, the
court was "unable to say on this record that the University's claims
to private status by themselves outweigh the particular offensiveness of the alleged misconduct. ' 35 Declaring that the district court
should not have dismissed the complaints without first using the
Jackson standard to determine the true extent of the state's financial
and regulatory involvement, the Second Circuit remanded the case
for further proceedings.

36

Like its previous decision in Jackson, the Second Circuit's
holding in Weise represents a significant departure from the
consensus of judicial opinion regarding the facts necessary to
sustain a finding of state action. As a general proposition courts
have refused to construct any specific test or formula to be applied
in determining precisely how much government involvement is
37
necessary before a private act can be deemed an act of the state.
473 (D.R.I. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 514 F.2d 344 (1st Cir. 1975). It should be
emphasized, however, that the mere receipt of state funds usually does not, by itself, indicate
the existence of state action. Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535,
547-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Student Due Process, supra note 28, at 915. And, even where funding
is just one of several ways in which the state is involved in a private activity, the courts will
require proof of some causal connection between that involvement and the particular act in
question. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974); Peterson v.
City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 247 (1963); Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671, 675
(10th Cir. 1973); Slavcoff v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hosp., 375 F. Supp. 999 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
33 The existence of substantial state regulation is frequently relied upon to establish state
action. See, e.g., Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970) (private college's
enforcement of state-required regulations for maintenance of campus order). Nevertheless,
here too, the governmental regulation must be connected to the activity in question. See, e.g.,
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (termination of plaintiff's
electrical service by state-regulated utility); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968)
(enforcement of college's disciplinary code).
34 The parties sharply disagreed as to the precise amount of state funds received by the
University. The defendant claimed that in 1973 state funds constituted only 3.6% of its
operating budget, a figure the court indicated would not sustain a finding of state action.
The plaintiffs, however, requested a hearing in order to demonstrate other sources of
allegedly substantial state support. 522 F.2d at 407. The Second Circuit also found the
record entirely lacking in evidence concerning the degree of control actually exercised by the
state in the University's hiring practices.
35 Id. at 408. The panel explained that when the private misdeeds of an educational
institution infringe on an individual's civil rights, the harm caused to the public interest may
compel the institution to forfeit its protected private status. Id. at 407. On the other hand,
the court recognized the wisdom of preserving a private sector in society unfettered by those
constitutional restrictions imposed on the states. Id. & n.13; accord, Wahba v. New York
Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974). See also 49 ST. JOHN's L. REV.
283, 297 (1975). To mediate between these two conflicting concerns the Weise panel
concluded that courts must employ a balancing process and weigh the actor's interest in
retaining its private character against the need to protect the public from particularly odius
and offensive conduct. 522 F.2d at 407.
36 522 F.2d at 408.
37 The Supreme Court has made clear its view that the development of an inflexible,
standardized test in the area of state action is impossible: "Only by sifting facts and weighing
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed
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In fact, the decisions clearly indicate that state action is to be
determined on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, it is almost uniformly required that a finding of state action be predicated upon
proof of some substantial involvement by the state as well as
evidence of a direct causal connection between that involvement
and the challenged activity. 38 In replacing these general principles
of substantial involvement and direct causal connection with a
specific five-part test applicable when the challenged misconduct is
viewed as particularly odius and invidious, the Jackson and Weise
decisions, it is submitted, have taken a questionable approach.
Courts, including the Second Circuit, have repeatedly rejected
claims of state action based on degrees of state involvement with
private colleges and institutions similar to, and sometimes even
greater than, that alleged in Weise. In Powe v. Miles, 39 for example,
its true significance." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). Accord,
McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781, 784 (1st Cir. 1971) ("we disavow any effort to be
definitive"). See also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 360 (1974) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); Moose Lodge v: Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
296, 299-300 (1966); Cohen, supra note 32, at 647; Note, State Action: Theoriesfor Applying
ConstitutionalRestrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
State Action].
38 It is clear that nominal state involvement with a private individual or institution will
not warrant a finding of state action. As stated in a district court decision affirmed by the
Third Circuit, "[t]he doctrine of State action must be subject to reasonable limitations. Quite
obviously, the influence and beneficial activities of the state permeate virtually every area of
human endeavor." Pennsylvania v. Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782, 788 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 392
F.2d 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 920 (1968) (finding of state action warranted only if
state significantly involved with the private conduct). See also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296,
299-300 (1966); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 247 (1963); New York Jaycees,
Inc. v. United States Jaycees, Inc., 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1975); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law
School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Stock v. Texas Catholic Interscholastic League, 364 F.
Supp. 362 (N.D. Tex. 1973); Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1973); State
Action, supra note 37, at 659-60.
Even a concededly significant degree of state involvement with the private actor,
moreover, does not constitute state action unless that involvement bears a close relation to
the allegedly wrongful act. For example, in Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 524 F.2d
818, rehearingand rehearingen banc denied, id. at 830 (7th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3474 (U.S. Feb. 13, 1976) (No. 75-1154), although a sufficiently substantial level of
state support for the defendant educational institution had been alleged in order to warrant
a state action finding, the court refused to make any such finding unless "that support had
furthered the specific policies or conduct under attack." Id. at 825. Since plaintiff was unable
to demonstrate any connection between the state's involvement and the gravamen of her
complaint, viz sex discrimination in employment, the action was dismissed. Id. at 826-27. In
accord with this holding is the Supreme Court's statement that "the inquiry must be whether
there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the
regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself."Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).Accord, Moose Lodge v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 162, 172 (1972).
It appears, therefore, that since the state may be involved in some of the activities of a
private individual or organization but not in others, it must be established that the action is
related to those particular activities with which the state is directly connected before a § 1983
action may be maintained. Cf. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
39407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968). In Powe the Second Circuit wrestled with a § 1983
challenge to the disciplinary procedures at Alfred University. Although Alfred is a private
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the Second Circuit refused to find state action when students in the
College of Liberal Arts at Alfred University were suspended for
having disrupted a military awards ceremony at the campus.
Alleging that the College's rule prohibiting on-campus
demonstrations denied them freedom of speech, the suspended
students brought an action under section 198a. Although the record revealed that Alfred University abided by the state's
educational standards and that one of its divisions, the College of
Ceramics, was owned and funded entirely by the state, 40 the Second Circuit rejected the claim of state action since the College of
Liberal Arts had only a minimal connection with the state. More
particularly, the court ruled that the act complained of did not
arise directly out of the state's involvement and indicated 'that as to
the liberal arts division state action could only be found if the state
had actually participated in promulgating or enforcing the rule in
question. 4 Claims of state action based on general state funding
and regulation of private colleges have been similarly rejected by
44
the Fourth, 4 2 Sixth, 43 and Tenth Circuits.
institution, included as one of its divisions is The New York State College of Ceramics, a
state owned and funded school which Alfred's officials administer pursuant to a contractual
arrangement. Whereas the court sustained the claim of three Ceramics students that the
University was engaged in state action when it subjected them to its disciplinary regulations,
id. at 82-83, the complaint of four Liberal Arts students challenging the same disciplinary
measures was dismissed. Id. at 81-82. The Second Circuit reasoned that the state was not
involved with the Liberal Arts division and that the defendants, when acting with regard
thereto, were acting as purely private individuals without any cloak of state authority. Id.
This dual aspect of Powe has been the subject of criticism since, in effect, it holds that
students in one division of Alfred University have access to constitutional guarantees while
those in another do not. See O'Neil, Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REv.
155, 160-61 (1970); 44 TUL. L. REV. 184 (1969). Nevertheless, aside from the practical
difficulties that it poses for Alfred University, the court's point seems well taken. The
University administrators clearly act for the state in relation to the Ceramics College while
these same officials operate in a purely private capacity with regard to the liberal arts
division.
40 407 F.2d at 75, 81.
41 Id., discussed in note 39 supra. In Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d
Cir. 1973), the plaintiffs correctly argued that the defendant received state and municipal
financial assistance and conformed to the academic requirements of New York's
Commissioner of Education for Law Schools. Nonetheless, the Grafton court found that the
school was not engaged in state action when it expelled a student for academic failure
because the matter involved lie in the discretion of the faculty and could not be attributed to
state involvement. Id. at 1143. In Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974), the Second Circuit again rejected a state action claim. There the
plaintiff was fired from the staff of a scientific research project conducted by the defendant
and funded by a government grant. The court reasoned that the state's involvement, no
matter how extensive, was not responsible for the allegedly wrongful act, which, the court
pointed out, resulted from a dispute between the plaintiff and his superior over the
publication of research findings. Furthermore, the court warned against an excessive imposition of constitutional requirements on the private sector reasoning that this could
dangerously restrict the freedom of movement and decision which the panel deemed vital to
endeavors
such as scientific research. 492 F.2d at 102.
42
See Robinson v. Davis, 447 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1972)
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The Weise court, nevertheless, found that the limitations
placed on the state action doctrine in these decisions 45 were not
controlling since they involved academic disciplinary disputes over
the guarantees of the first amendment. Sex discrimination, said the
court, was misconduct of a more serious nature justifying
application of a less exacting standard. 46 This notion of a less
exacting state action standard in sex discrimination cases, however,
appears to be in conflict with several previous decisions. In New
York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, Inc., 47 a case which
managed to escape the attention of the Weise court although it was
decided only 4 months earlier, the Second Circuit specifically
rejected a claim of state action despite the fact that sex
discrimination was the subject of the complaint. Seeking to enjoin
the national and state organizations from revoking its charter
because it had admitted women to membership, 48 the plaintiff, a
local Jaycees chapter, claimed that the national organization was
engaged in state action because it received more than 30 percent of
its operating budget from government funds, 4 9 enjoyed a federal
tax exemption,5 0 and served a public function. 5 1 The panel ex(college and local municipality operated in interdependent fashion), discussed in Note, Private
Universities:
The Courts and the State Action Theories, 29 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 320 (1972).
43
See Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121, 122-23 (6th Cir. 1971) (university
organized pursuant to state law had state tax exemption and was situated on property
largely acquired through eminent domain).
"See Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir. 1969) (private university with
state tax exemption extending to income derived from land not used for educational
purposes).
In other cases where the courts have found that private colleges were engaging in state
action, a substantially greater degree of state involvement was usually present and a direct
connection between that involvement and the challenged acts could be found. Thus, for
example, in Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970), where the state had
specifically required the promulgation of disciplinary rules the enforcement of which was the
subject of the complaint, its responsibility for the challenged action could be identified.
Similary, in Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334. (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974),
state action was found because the college was under the direct management and control of
the state's educational authorities.
4
See notes 39-44 and accompanying text supra.
46 522 F.2d at 406. Although the court noted that the interests affected in some of the
discipline cases arose out of such delicate areas as the grading of academic examinations
(Grafton) and the conducting of scientific research (Wahba), it regarded these disputes
beyond the proper scope of judicial inquiry and simply not amenable to resolution by the
courts. In comparison, the court found the question in Weise - "whether or riot invidious
discrimination has occurred" - to be "well within an area of recognized judicial competence
.
Id. . at 406.
47 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1975). The unanimous opinion of Judge Hays was joined in by
Judges
Waterman and Mulligan.
8
4 Id. at 857-58.
41 Id. at 858. In contrast, the degree of state financial support initially alleged in Weise
amounted to only 3.6% of the defendant's operating budget. 522 F.2d at 407.
50 512 F.2d at 858. As the Weise panel pointed out, federal involvement is entirely
irrelevant to a state action claim. 522 F.2d at 404.
51 512 F.2d at 858. The Weise court fully discounted the public function argument as
applied to Syracuse University. 522 F.2d at 404 n.6.
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plained, however, that a mere showing of governmental "ties" to a
private organization was insufficient and insisted that the plaintiff
demonstrate some connection be-tween the state's presence and the
offending activity. Since the alleged government involvement had
no relation to the defendant's discriminatory membership
policies, 5 2 the court ruled that no state action finding could be
supported.
Clearly, the Jaycees panel subscribed to the traditional state
action requirements: substantial government involvement and a
causal link connecting that invf6lvement with the alleged misconduct. Nowhere in its opinion did the court suggest that the
standard might be made less stringent because the complaint
alleged sex discrimination. The Eighth 53 and Tenth 54 Circuits,
moreover, dealing with virtually the same Jaycees' policies, similarly
refused to find state action. Also instructive is the Third Circuit's
opinion in Braden v. University of Pittsburgh.55 As in Weise, the Braden
plaintiff, seeking relief under section 1983, was a female professor
who alleged sex discrimination in the defendant University's
general employment practices. Although the Third Circuit
reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint and
remanded the case for a further factual determination, the panel's
decision was not predicated upon any reduction in the state action
standard. On the contrary, the Braden court determined that the
controlling test, once all the facts are in, is whether the state " 'has
so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence' with the
University that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the
challenged activity ... 56. Equally significant is the opinion of the
then Judge Stevens writing for the Seventh Circuit in Cohen v.
Illinois Institute of Technology. 57 As in Weise, the Cohen plaintiff was a
52 512 F.2d at 858-59. TheJaycees court explained that although government funds were
used to support various Jaycees programs across the country, there was no connection
between this funding and the sex discrimination complained of since women participated
both in implementing these government-supported programs and in selecting local recipients for the aid. Furthermore, the benefits of these programs were distributed without
regard to gender. Id. at 859.
Plaintiff's constitutional challenge is addressed solely to the internal membership,
policies of the Jaycees; yet plaintiff has made no showing that the government is
substantially, or even minimally, involved in the adoption or enforcement of these
policies.
Id. (footnote omitted).
'3 See Junior Chamber of Commerce v. Missouri St. Junior Chamber of Commerce, 508
F.2d 1031 (8th Cir. 1975).
"' See Junior Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, Inc., 495 F.2d 883
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974).
" 477 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'g and remanding 343 F. Supp. 836 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
56 477 F.2d at 4, quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
7524 F.2d 818, rehearingand rehearingen banc denied, id. at 830 (7th Cir. 1975), petition
for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3474 (U.S. Feb. 13, 1976) (No. 75-1154).
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female professor who claimed that she had suffered sex
discrimination when her application for tenure was denied by the
defendant institution. Bringing suit under section 1983,58 the
plaintiff alleged the existence of state action in that the defendant
used the word "Illinois" in its name, 59 received extensive public
6n
financial support, 60 and was subject to pervasive state regulation .
Like the Jaycees and Braden courts, however, the Cohen panel
adhered to the requirement of a causal connection between the
state's involvement and the alleged misconduct. Finding no such
connection, the panel unanimously affirmed the district court's
62
dismissal of the complaint.
It appears, therefore, that the Weise panel's decision to apply a
less stringent state action test in cases of discrimination based on
sex is indeed questionable. In fact, the whole notion, first advanced
in Jackson, of varying the state action staridard according to the
nature of the wrong alleged has been the subject of extensive
debate. Although ultimately denied, en banc reconsideration of
Jackson was favored by four Second Circuit judges. 63 Dissenting
from the decision to deny reconsideration, Judge Friendly angrily
denounced the Jackson state action test. 64 Finding little merit in the
position that the standard should be relaxed for alleged racial
discrimination, he based his opposition on the Supreme Court's
decision in Moose Lodge v. Irvis6 5 where a claim of state action was

"I

The plaintiff simultaneously sought relief under § 1985(3), the conspiracy provision
also relied upon by the Weise plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of this
action on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to allege the deprivation of a federally
protected right. 524 F.2d at 828.
.1 The court found that the use of the name "Illinois" was of little significance since it
had no bearing on the defendant's personnel policies. Id. at 824-25.
60 The financial support alleged consisted of direct state grants to the defendant
institution, state scholarships to its students, and the use of eminent domain to acquire
property in the defendant's name. Id. at 823 n.9.
61 The alleged state regulation governed the quality of academic courses, the reasonableness of fees, and the adequacy of facilities. The only regulations relating to faculty were
those regarding academic credentials and competency to teach. Id. at 823-24 n.10.
62 [The State's support of I.I.T. is sufficiently significant to require a finding of
state action if that support has furthered the specific policies or conduct under
attack. Again, however, there is no allegation in the complaint that the various
forms of assistance given to I.I.T.... have had any impact whatsoever on the ability
of Dr. Cohen, or any other member of her sex, to be treated impartially by the
administration of the Institute.
Id. at 825. The Cohen court briefly discussed the Weise decision, but failed to offer an opinion
as to the wisdom of the Second Circuit's holding. Although the court did suggest that a
greater degree of dependence on state aid was alleged in Weise than in the case before it, the
panel concluded that it "need not decide whether [it] would have ordered a trial of the Weise
complaint ....
Id. at 827.
63496 F.2d at 636. Judges Friendly, Hays, Feinberg, and Mulligan voted in favor of en
banc reconsideration; Chief Judge Kaufman and Judges Mansfield, Oakes, and Timbers
were opposed.
64 Id. at 636-37. (Friendly, J., dissenting).
65407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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rejected despite the fact that the defendant had a state liquor
license and was subject to certain state regulations.6" By holding
that state action can only be established when there is a substantial
degree of governmental involvement directly connected to the
challenged activity, 67 the Court seems to have rejected the notion
that a reduced state action standard is appropriate in racial
discrimination cases.6 8 In view of this authority, the propriety of
the Jackson decision is cast into serious doubt, and its offspring,
Weise, becomes even more questionable. Furthermore, the
purported premise for the use of a less stringent state action test is
suspect since one may easily wonder why it is any more odius to
discriminate against a person on the basis of his race or sex than it
is to deny him his freedom of speech, press, or religion.6 9
Rather than rest its reversal on the seemingly clear indication
that the Title VII violations dismissed by the district court were
actionable, 70 the Weise panel broadly expanded the purview of
section 1983. Originally enacted as a shield against the excesses of
the states, 7' the statute, as applied by the Weise andJackson courts,
has become a means for redressing the alleged misconduct of what
are essentially private institutions. The ultimate effect of such an
application is the exposure of universities and other private entities
to an imposing new array of civil liabilities. 72 However gratifying
66 In order to obtain a liquor license, the Lodge had to abide by the requirements of the
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board. This entailed making certain physical alterations, filing
a complete membership roster with the Board, and maintaining detailed financial records.
The Court ruled that no matter how extensive this type of regulation may be, "it cannot be
said 6to
in any way foster or encourage racial discrimination." Id. at 176-77.
7
1d. at 173, 176-77.
68See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REv. 74, 75 (1972); 49 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 283, 286 (1975).
69 One author has suggested that the "varying standard" approach to state action is
merely used by the courts as a tool which enables them to take jurisdiction of interesting
cases and avoid those that are more delicate and volatile. See 44 TUL. L. REv. 184, 189-91
(1969). Another commentator has noted that "to say that certain indicia [of state involvement] constitute state action for one purpose, but not for another, may be a way of
concealing the court's idiosyncratic judgment of the desirability of the challenged practice
." 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045, 1060 (1968).
70 See note 18 supra.
71See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11
(1883); Williams v. Yellow Cab Co., 200 F.2d 302, 307 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
840 (1953); Oppenheimer v. Stillwell, 132 F. Supp. 761, 763 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
72 In his dissenting opinion in Jackson, Judge Friendly described the potential effect of
this new civil liability as "staggering." 496 F.2d at 638 (Friendly, J., dissenting). He indicated
that if a finding of state action can be predicated on minimal state involvement, virtually
every decision made by such private entities as charitable foundations and educational
institutions could be subject to judicial scrutiny. As a result, these organizations may be
forced to defend an endless parade of civil suits which would lead to a depletion of funds
and a diverting of endowments away from the donor's intended purposes. Id. Similarly, in
Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974), the
Second Circuit warned that the proposed extension of liability would unnecessarily tax the
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this may be to civil rights advocates, it seems clear that such a result
is simply not warranted by the weight of judicial authority.
Hopefully, therefore, courts faced with similar circumstances will
reject the ill-conceived theories of the Jackson and Weise opinions.
Indeed, they would do better to bear in mind the simple maxim
that "[t]he state action, not the private action, must be the subject
73
of complaint.
Thomas P. Wagner

FORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCE TEST FOR DE JURE SEGREGATION

Hart v. Community School Board
Since the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of
Education,1 de jure segregation, i.e. that which is a product of
intentionally segregative state action, has been held to be
unconstitutional.2 De facto segregation, on the other hand, has
been viewed as permissible because of the absence of deliberate
state involvement.3 This very distinction has inevitably led to the
problem of determining what types of action by a state will qualify
valuable time of a private institution's personnel in forcing them to repeatedly defend the
propriety of their professional decisions.
73 Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968).
1347 U.S. 483 (1854).
In Brown, Negro children sought admission to public schools on a nonsegregated basis.
They had been denied admission to schools attended by white children pursuant to various
state laws which either required or permitted segregation according to race. In sustaining
the state's segregativ& policies, the lower courts had relied on the "separate but equal"
doctrine announced by the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The
Brown Court, however, concluded that under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, "the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place." 347 U.S. at 495. According
to the Court, "[sleparate educational facilities are inherently unequal." Id.
3See generally Note, Toward the Elimination of De Facto Segregation in Public Schools, 20
CATHOLIC LAWYER 60, 61-64 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Public Schools]. Where there is no
showing of state action, segregation has been upheld as de facto. In Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of
Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967), for example, the
segregation of the Cincinnati Public School System was declared constitutional since no state
action had been alleged. As the court noted,
a showing of harm alone is not enough to invoke the remedial powers of the law. If
the state or any of its agencies has not adopted impermissible racial criteria in its
treatment of individuals, then there is no violation of the Constitution.
369 F.2d at 59.
In some cases, segregation has also been viewed as de facto, and therefore permissible,
even when state action was present provided segregative intent did not exist. In Bell v.
School City, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964), the Seventh
Circuit sustained the constitutionality of a Gary, Indiana segregated school system. The
court based its holding on a finding that the neighborhood school plan which had caused the
segregation was "honestly and conscientiously constructed" by the school authorities. 324
F.2d at 213, quoting Bell v. School City, 213 F. Supp. 819, 829 (N.D. Ind. 1963).
2

